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NOTES
EXTENDING COLLATERAL ATTACK: AN INVITATION
TO REPETITIOUS LITIGATION*
A POLICY of settling disputes quickly and cleanly would allow the disput-
ants one fair trial, ending in a judgment that is absolutely binding on the loser.
But there is always a danger that the loser lost because of harmful errors in
the proceeding, rather than because he had the poorer case. To prevent judg-
ments in such cases from freezing into finality, two methods of attack-"di-
rect" and "collateral" -are made available to the loser.1 Most errors open a
judgment only to direct attack,2 which is usually a continuation of the original
action, either as an appeal or through a motion in the rendering court to set
aside the judgment.3 In rarer cases a "direct" attack may also be made by
an independent equity suit, brought in a different court, to enjoin enforcement
of the judgment.4 But whatever the form of the direct attack, the aggrieved
party must either have prosecuted his claim promptly or have thoroughly justi-
fied his delay.5 In a collateral attack, which may be brought in any court at
* Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. dcicd, 338 U.S. 816 (1949).
1. See 1 F ma-Ax, JuDrNrs §§ 304, 305 (5th ed. 1925) (cited hereafter as Fr=-
aAN); 1 BAcy, JuDGmENTs §252 (1891); V.A FL.=r, CouA.ERnA ATwcn §§2, 3
(1892). Classification of attacks as "direct" or "collateral" has been so inconsistent that
"[e]xcept in the light of some... particular purpose, attempted distinctions are probably
futile." ARuoLD & JAus-s, CASES ON TRALS, JUDGIENTS Ai' ArPEALs 137 (1936). For
an outline of the definitional confusion, see 1 Fmm.AN 606-3. Even the proper categori-
zation of particular proceedings is debatable. E.g., compare 1 FR muA" § 303 (independ-
ent equity suit--"direct" attack) with 1 BLAcri, JUDGaENTS § 253 (1891) (same--'col-
lateral" attack). See, generally, 1 FREaIAx §§ 304-16; A 0noma & JAzms, stpra, at
136-8.
The most common distinction between the categories of attack is in terms of the pur-
pose of the proceeding in which the assault is made: a "direct" attack is one made in a
proceeding brought for the e.\press purpose of upsetting the judgment, while a "collateral"
attack is one made in a proceeding brought for some other or "collateral" purpose. Once
classified as "collateral" an attack is not only confined to certain particularly grievous
errors, see notes 7 and 8 infra, but the attacker is often further restricted to proving them
solely by reference to the judgment record itself. See 1 FRamsA 781 and §§ 375-6.
2. See 1 id. 645. The traditional lingo is that certain errors make a judgment merely
"voidable" (i.e., open only to "direct" attack) while others make a judgment '%oid" (open
also to "collateral" attack). Id. § 322; 1 BLAcK, JuDear.rs § 170 (1891). The terms
are not helpful.
3. See I FREESmA § 307.
4. Where fraud or accident deprived the losing party of a fair chance to present his
case, he may move to vacate the judgment in the rendering court, 1 id. §§ 231-51, or he
may bring an independent equity suit in any court. 3 id. §§ 1179, 1181, 1231-47; 3 Mo.,
FEDuL PnAcncE 3272 et seq. (1st ed. 1938). Though usually these attacks are called
"direct," there is disagreement as to the proper classification of the equity suit. See note
1 supra.
5. See 1 F ,r.alAx 603, 645, and §§266-272; 3 id. §§ 1192, 1204.
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any time, he need do neither.6 Therefore, since collateral attacks tend to de-
feat the policy of prompt settlement of actions, they are usually limited to
errors presumed so prejudicial that the rendering court may be said to have
lacked jurisdiction7 or have violated due process.8 In the recent case of Bass
v. Hoaglandg however, Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit relaxed the
traditional boundaries and allowed a much wider resort to collateral attack
than has heretofore been permitted.
A Kansas citizen brought a personal injury action against a Texas citizen
in a Kansas federal court. Plaintiff claimed a jury trial.10 The defendant,
remaining in Texas, retained Kansas counsel who filed an answer denying his
client's liability but later withdrew from the case. When no one appeared for
defendant at the trial, the court considered him in default and gave judgment
for plaintiff. Nearly three years later plaintiff brought suit on the judgment
in a Texas federal court." Defendant now attacked the original judgment,
claiming that his attorney had abandoned him without notice, and that the
judgment was rendered without pre-default judgment notice under Federal
6. 1 id. § 322.
7. 1 id. § 339 (jurisdiction over the parties) ; 1 id. § 337 (jurisdiction over subject
matter of the action). It was formerly said that lack of jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter is always ground for collateral attack because such jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
the parties or assumed by the court. 1 id. at 676. The trend, however, is toward closing
attacks on this kind of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165 (1938) (issue
contested) ; Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371 (1940)
(issue could have been contested). This corresponds with the growing tendency to restrict
collateral attack in the interest of achieving greater finality in litigation. See Notes, 9
OH3io ST. L.J. 539 (1948) ; 29 GEo. L.J. 204 (1940).
The victorious party's fraud, rather than the court's lack of jurisdiction, has been the
basis for allowing a few collateral attacks. Nardi v. Poinsatte, 46 F.2d 347 (N.D. Ind.
1931); Stephens Fuel Co. v. Bay Parkway Nat'l Bank of Brooklyn, 10 F. Supp. 395
(E.D.N.Y. 1935). Usually, however, such fraud is assailed in an independent equity suit
regarded as a direct attack. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U.S. 86 (1889) ; Rhino
v. Emery, 72 Fed. 382 (6th Cir. 1895). See 1 FREMAN § 331; 3 id. § 1231.
8. The due process notion has two uses in collateral attacks: (1) Errors usually
called jurisdictional are cast in due process terms, evidently to frame a constitutional issue
in the hope of ultimate review by the United States Supreme Court. E.g., Scott v. McNeal,
154 U.S. 34 (1894) (probate court had no jurisdiction over estate of living person) ; Pen-
noyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (no jurisdiction over defendant). (2) Errors not
easily cast in jurisdictional terms are called a violation of due process which in turn de-
prived the rendering court of jurisdiction. E.g., Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897)
(judgment for contempt rendered without hearing).
9. 172 F2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 70 S.Ct. 57 (1949).
10. This operated as a demand by the defendant, since a jury claim may not be with-
drawn without mutual consent. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
149 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1945).
11. There is no longer any need for a party who has won a judgment in one federal
district court to sue on it in order to get execution elsewhere: a final judgment may now
be registered in any district and executed as if rendered there. 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1948).
While this provision will save judgment creditors the expense of starting a new suit to se-
cure foreign execution, it should not affect a judgment debtor's right to attack collaterally.
See MoomR, JuDrcAL CODE COMMENTARY 385-6 (1949).
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Rule 55, without a jury trial, and without hearing any evidence. He further
claimed that the clerk of the court had sent no notice after judgment, as re-
quired by Rule 77, and that he was unaware of the result until rudely informed
by the new action.' 2  It was then too late to appea1 3
Assuming the truth of these charges, the Te.xas district court regarded
them as a collateral attack on the judgment. Since no single aspect of the
Kansas proceeding had previously been enough to sustain a successful col-
lateral attack in the federal courts,14 it decided for plaintiff on the pleadings.
On appeal from that decision the Fifth Circuit could have regarded de-
fendant's plight as due (1) to the fact that he was never able to present his
case, because of abandonment by his attorney, or (2) to procedural errors in
the original action. The court took the latter view. It simply assumed that
the defendant was making a collateral attack, and further assumed that the pro-
cedural irregularities of which he complained were prejudicial "errors." It
then held that these "errors" amounted to a denial of due process'0 that would
upset the judgment, and sent the case back for trial on the merits. It is not
entirely clear whether its decision rested on the lack of jury trial alone10 or
also on the failure to hear evidence on liability and damages and on the failure
12. The defendant also alleged contributory negligence, challenged the damages as
unconscionable, and claimed that plantiff had acted fraudulently in proceeding to judg-
ment while knowing that defendant's counsel had abandoned him without his knowledge.
The Texas court considered none of these charges, though the fraud, if established, might
have been ground for collateral attack. See note 7 supra.
13. Fan. R_ Civ. P. 73(a) (normal appeal time--30 days).
14. Most of the procedure complained of has been expressly repudiated as a ground
for collateral attack: (1) Lack of jury trial: Maxwell v. Stewart, 22 Wall. 77 (U.S.
1874); cf. Halligan v. Carlson, 105 Conn. 245, 135 At. 39 (1926). Contra: Matheny v.
Greider, 115 XV. Va. 763, 177 S.E. 769 (1934). (2) Failure to hear any evidence:
Stephenson v. Kirtley, 269 U.S. 163 (1925) ; Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S. 235 (1895) ;
Grieshaber v. Knoepfel, 119 Misc. 827, 198 N.Y. Supp. 302 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Globe & Re-
public Ins. Co. v. Shields, 170 Tenn. 485, 96 SAV.2d 947 (1936). (3) Lack of notice be-
fore default judgment: Gray v. Hall, 203 Cal. 306, 265 Pac. 246 (1928) ; cf. United States
v. Borchers, 163 F.2d 347 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 811 (1947).
Lack of notice after rendition of a federal judgment has never opened the judgment
to collateral attack. Nor would such a result be reasonable, since post-judgment notice
was designed merely as an accommodation for the loser. Failure to send the notice does
not even extend appeal time. See Fan. R. Crv. P. 77(d) and Notes of Advisory Committee
on Rules, 28 U.S.C. following § 723(c) (1946). The only ground for such an extension
is excusable neglect in not learning of the judgment. FED. R. Crv. P. 73(a). This neces-
sity for justifying his own conduct puts the loser virtually in the shoes of one seeking
equitable relief.
Abandonment of a party by his counsel has not been held ground for collateral attack,
though it does afford the basis for direct relief. See notes 41 and 43 infra.
15. 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949). The court said that because the judgment as
rendered without due process it was rendered without jurisdiction, and thus was attack-
able collaterally. Id. at 209. See note 8 supra.
16. This was the view of the dissenting judge: "The majority... seems to hold
that judgment here without [a] jury rendered the judgment void." 172 F2d 205, 211 (Sth
Cir. 1949).
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to give pre-judgment notice.17 But in either event the decision can have un-
fortunate consequences.
If all four "errors" are necessary to deny due process, the Bass case ad-
vances the novel proposition that several errors which individually may only
be prejudicial enough to open the judgment to direct attack can have the cumu-
lative effect of opening a judgment to collateral attack.'8 Armed with this
handy doctrine of "cumulative error," many a loser who failed to appeal will
later attack collaterally by arguing that a number of lesser errors lumped to-
gether denied him due process. On the other hand, if the Bass case rests
simply on the lack of jury trial it may open the way to a collateral attack
whenever a court erroneously refuses a jury on the ground that the issues were
not so triable' 9 or that a jury had been waived.20 Either interpretation of
the Bass decision will give judgment losers an unwarranted chance to prolong
litigation.
The court created this unhappy prospect by assuming, with scant discussion,
that the four procedural omissions were "errors." Except for the failure to
hear evidence on unliquidated damages,21 it is highly doubtful that they were
even errors subject to direct, let alone collateral, attack. Under the policy of
expediting litigation which is embodied in the Federal Rules,22 a full-dress
jury trial is reserved to the litigant who not only presents a case with issues
of fact" but also asserts his rights diligently.2 4 Therefore the court would
17. Id. at 210. It is also possible that the court regarded all the "errors" as adding
up to an injustice to the defendant.. It did not, however, articulate such a view. See note
18 infra.
18. This proposition has been openly advanced only in Hicks v. Hiatt, 64 F. Supp. 238,
249-50 (M.D. Pa. 1946) : "Casting up all of the errors committed [they] were so num-
erous and of such effect as to deprive [petitioner] of the substance of a fair trial." Here,
however, the case came up on a petition for habeas corpus, where the policy of assuring a
fair trial has been accorded increasing importance at the expense of the finality of judg-
ments. See Note, 61 H1Av. L. Rxv. 657 (1948).
The notion of "cumulative error" may also have prompted courts to upset civil judg-
ments collaterally. But traditional dogma prohibits overt reliance on such a doctrine, since
the distinction between errors directly attackable and those collaterally attackable is based
on the kind of errors involved rather than their actual effect on the litigant. See 1 Film-
MAX §§ 322, 357; Note, 14 CAN. B. RExv. 157, 158 (1936).
19. The decision whether an issue is triable of right to a jury requires the judge to
make an excursion into the history of "law" and "equity." See CLARKc, CoDn PLEADING;
§ 16 (1947). If he reads his history wrong (i.e., differently from a higher court) he has
committed reversible error. E.g., Ring v. Spina, 166 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1948).
20. The judge who denies a jury trial on the ground that it was demanded too late
(see FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d), 5(d)) commits error if the appellate court finds the demand
was made in time. E.g., Berslavsky v. Caffrey, 161 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1947).
21. See note 30 infra.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See 2 MooRE, Fzn aRL PRAcrIcE 55-7 (2d ed. 1948). And see
note 37 infra.
23. Failure to present such issues at the outset results in summary judgment. E.g,
Piantadosi v. Loew's, Inc., 137 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1943); Austin v. United States, 125
F2d 816 (7th Cir. 1942). See CLARK, CODE PL aDING § 88 (1947) ; Clark & Samenow,
The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE LJ. 423 (1928). See also note 33 infra. Similarly,
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have been justified in regarding the defendant's non-appearance at the trial
as (1) a default,2 5 which would eliminate as error the lack of jury trial and
failure to hear evidence on liability; or (2) a waiver of jury trial,^ which
would also eliminate the requirement of pre-judgment notice.
In the traditional default judgment, a litigant's failure to take some re-
quired step in the pre-trial stage27 is deemed an admission of his opponent's
claim,28 eliminating any need for a jury trial2 except on unliquidated dam-
ages. 30 The default provision in Rule 55 authorizes a judgment against any
default judgments proceed on the theory that a litigant who fails to press his case does
not have one worthy of trial. See notes 27 and 28 infra.
24. See notes 27 and 28, infra (default) and CLAM, Coon PLEADIvO 113-16 (1947)
(waiver of jury trial). The fundamental prerequisite to the jury trial right is, of course,
that the issues be regarded historically as so triable. See Fa. R. CIV. P. 38(a), 39(a);
and note 19 supra.
25. Both the Kansas district judge and the dissenting judge in Bass v. Hoagland
took this view. 172 F2d 205, 207,212 (5th Cir. 1949).
26. See p. 351 infra.
Neither default nor waiver was urged by the Bass plaintiff. Instead he chose tra-
ditional doctrine: the judgment could not be impeached in an action upon it because
the rendering court had jurisdiction. 172 F.2d 205, 207 (5th Cir. 1949). See 1 Fn==.L-i
606-8. The Fifth Circuit countered that the rendering court lost its jurisdiction when
it denied the defendant due process. 172 F2d 205, 209. In his petition for rehearing,
plaintiff invoked a second concept: since the Kansas judgment was regular on its face and
rendered by a court of general jurisdiction, it could not be contradicted by defendant's
extrinsic evidence. Appellee's Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing S. See 1
FaEF.Ax 606-8. The court in its original opinion had acknowledged the existence of
this doctrine but ignored its possible application. 172 F2d 205, 203 (5th Cir. 1949).
The case affords yet another example of the futility of relying on doctrinal distinc-
tions to solve particular problems in the collateral attack field. See note 1 sipra.
27. For example, default judgments have long been rendered for failure to appear
in the action, to plead, to answer interrogatories, or to file an affidavit of defense as re-
quired by statute. See 3 FamAx §§ 1266-76.
While default judgments are not usually rendered against a party who has pleaded
without first striking his pleading, 3 id. § 1270, this custom is not required by Frm. R.
Civ. P. 55. Indeed the penalties for refusing to permit discovery allow a pleading to be
stricken as an alternative to a default judgment4 not as a condition precedent to it. FED.
R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (iii), (d).
28. E.g., Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 351 (1908). See 3
FREar.cur § 1287.
This "admission of claim" fiction is a handy device for rationalizing a default judg-
ment, but perhaps no more than that. The justification for shortcutting the normal course
of proceedings is to prevent one party from stalling off judgment simply by refusing to
take a step necessary to move the case toward trial. Sec Coggin v. Barfield, 150 Fla.
551, 554, 8 So. 2d 9, 11 (1942). And the justification for not requiring formal proof of
liability would seem to be the saving in time and expense for all concerned. It is this
last consideration that should justify a default judgment for failure to appear at the
trial. See note 36 infra.
29. See 3 FrnxuAN §§1282, 1287. See note 33 infra.
Proof is required, however, before a default judgment can be rendered against the
United States. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(e).
30. See 3 Fnm=AN 2673-4. It is doubtful, however, whether the constitutional right
to jury also applies. While such a right has been affirmed (Thorpe v. Nat'l City Ban:
19501
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
"party who has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules."
The Fifth Circuit limited the rule to the traditional default situation by in-
terpreting the crucial words "otherwise defend" to mean only motions made
in place of pleadings.31 It regarded an extension to include absence at the
trial as a violation of the constitutional right to a jury.3 2 But this right is
guaranteed only where there is an issue of fact,"3 3 and there can hardly be an
issue of fact when the defendant does not make an appearance to argue one.
Since he had notice of the trial date,84 his failure to appear is as much an ad-
mission of plaintiff's claim as is failure to plead within the allotted time,35 and
of Tampa, 274 Fed. 200 (6th Cir. 1921)), the contrary seems the better view. For the
Constitution only secures the right to a jury where such right existed at common law.
Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935). And early English cases
indicate that a jury trial on unliquidated damages in default cases was granted only at
the court's discretion. E.g., Bruce v. Rawlins, 3 Wils. K. B, 61, 95 Eng. Rep. 934 (1770).
In the United States, this developed into a regular practice of trial by the court alone.
E.g., Brown v. Van Braam, 3 Dall. 344, 354 (U.S. 1797). One writer concludes that in
actions going by default neither party has a right to a jury trial on any issue at all. 3
Mooap, FxEERA PRAcricE 3167, 3186 (1st ed. 1938).
31. "The words 'otherwise defend' refer to attacks on the service, or motions to
dismiss, or for better particulars, and the like, which may prevent default without pres-
ently pleading to the merits." 172 F.2d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 1949).
32. Id. at 209-10.
33. "No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury unless and except so far as
there are issues of fact to be determined." Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920),
See note 23 supra.
34. The opinion and record in Bass v. Hoagland do not disclose whether the defend-
ant himself had actual notice of the trial date. But notice is imputable to a client when
it is charged to his attorney. Davenport v. Davenport, 69 Mont. 405, 222 Pac, 422 (1924),
And here the defendant's attorney could properly be charged with notice of the date, since
he did not withdraw until some time after the pleadings were closed. 172 F.2d 205, 207
(5th Cir. 1949).
Actual notice of the trial date is not essential; where given, it is merely an accomino-
dation within the court's discretion. See FED. R. Civ. P. 40 and the discussion of post-
judgment notice in note 14 supra. Responsibility for appearing at the trial is placed on
the attorney of record. E.g., CALENDAR RuLE 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1938) ; CALENDAR RULE 1(j)
(N.D. Ia. 1938). And adequate notice is effected at least from the time the case is
listed on the jury calendar. See, e.g., CALENDAR RuLE 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); CALENDARt
RULE 7 (N.D. Ia. 1938); RULE PaOcQ 12 (S.D. Cal. 1938); RuLE 9 (D. Kan. 1940).
Since this listing is a normal step after the joinder of issues, see CALENDAR RULE 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1938), the party could properly be charged with notice of the trial date from
the time of joinder. Cf. Miera v. Simmons, 31 N.M. 599, 248 Pac. 1096 (1926); Hart-
man v. Byrd, 47 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
35. The fact that an answer denying liability remains on file should not prevent a
default for failure to appear at the trial. See note 27 supra.
In the absence of statutory authority, such a judgment was held improper in Frucci
v. Winters, 247 App. Div. 866, 286 N.Y. Supp. 781 (1936) ; Panhandle & S.F. Ry. v. Law-
less, 94 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). But see Pratte & Cabanne v. Corl, 9 Mo. 101
(1845) ; Gregson v. Syperior Court, 46 R.I. 362, 128 Atl. 221 (1925).
Iowa is the only state with an explicit statutory provision for default judgment in
event of such non-appearance. IowA CoDE 2169, Rule Civ. P. 230 (1946).
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is no less an abandonment of the right to a jury trial and a hearing on the
issue of liability.3 6
In addition to the default rationale, the court could have applied a waiver
theory under which both lack of jury trial and failure of notice would cease
to be errors. Under Rule 38 a jury is automatically waived unless promptly
demanded. It is quite consistent with this policy of lightening the jury loada"
also to condition a jury trial on a party's diligence in appearing to take ad-
vantage of it.3 It may be argued that the letter of Rule 39 bars the federal
courts from considering such absence as a waiver: once a jury has been de-
manded the trial "shall be by jury, unless . . . the parties . . . by written
stipulation or by oral stipulation made in open court consent to trial by the
court [alone]." But the history of Rule 39 indicates that the "shall be" need
not preclude a finding of waiver in other conduct inconsistent with an intent to
assert the right to a jury. 9  And even if the "shall be" were regarded as
36. The Kansas court in the Bass case erred in rendering a default judgment against
the defendant, for non-appearance at the trial, without giving notice as required by
Fmn. L Civ. P. 55(b) (2). But the requirement of notice affords the defendant much
less protection at this stage than in the pre-trial stage. In the latter situation the default
judgment is a device to keep the defendant from dragging his feet. See note 28 supra.
When he fails to plead, the plaintiff's move is to apply for a default judgment. Notice
then enables the defendant to come into court and, if his excuse is good, have the default
set aside and file his pleading so the case may proceed toward normal trial. If the de-
fault is made to stand, the defendant losds his jury trial and his right to litigate liability,
but may still contest the amount of unliquidated damages. See note 30 .supra. But where
the case has worked its way up the calendar to a scheduled trial date, and the defendant
then fails to appear, the plaintiff may well not apply for a default judgment if it could
only be granted after notice and further delay. A wiser move would be for plaintiff to
waive the defendant's "default" and request trial immediately-putting on his cx Parte
proof before the jury. The defendant's only satisfaction then would be that at least a jury
did hear plaintiff's story before deciding in his favor.
37. See James, Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules of Procedure, 45 YA.E UJ.
1022, 1026 (1936). For an excellent study of the cost and time-consuming aspects of jury
trials, see Clark & Shulman, Jury Trials in Civil Cases-A Study it Judicial Admrinstra-
tion, 43 YALs L.J. 867 (1934).
38. Even in states where empress waiver is required by statute, non-appearance at the
trial is usually specified as such a waiver. E.g., Aam STAT. ANN. §27-1743 (1947);
flxx. STAT. ANN. § 546.26 (West 1947); Mo. Rxy. STAT. ANN. § 1101 (1942). See
CLAxx, CODE PLEADInG 115 n.104 (1947). Moreover, as the states turn away from ex-
press waiver to waiver by non-demand, see id. at 115, absence at the trial is being in-
cluded as an automatic waiver of jury. Thus Colorado has a rule identical with FE. R.
Civ. P. 38, plus a specific provision that such non-appearance is a waiver. CoLO. STAT.
ANN., Rule Civ. P. 39(a) (3) (1946). And Iowa recently went a step farther to make
absence at the trial a default. IOWA CODE 2169, Rule Civ. P. 230 (1946).
The tendency to extend waiver is evident also in criminal cases. Adams v. McCann,
317 U.S. 269 (1942) (waiver of entire jury permitted, for first time, in federal felony
trial). See Oppenheim, Waiver of Jury in Criminal Cases, 25 ifcH. L. Rav. 695 (1927);
Note, 28 WAsH. U.L.Q. 175 (1943).
39. The "shall be" of Rule 39 originated in the Judiciary Act of 1789: "the trial
of issues of fact.. . shall - . . be by jury [except in equity and admiralty suits].' 1
STAT. 80 (1789), as amended, 28 U.S.C. §770 (1946). In spite of this mandatory lan-
1950]
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mandatory, a party's absence at the trial might be deemed an assent to trial by
the judge alone which, joined in by his opponent in open court, would provide
the oral consent called for by the rule. Under the waiver theory the Kansas
court's omission of pre-judgment notice is irrelevant, since this special notice
is required, if at all, only before a default judgment.
Thus, assuming that the defendant in the Bass case spoke the truth, the
injustice of the original judgment lay not in any aspect of the proceeding itself
but in the silent withdrawal of his attorney. Even so, it seems only fair to
the plaintiff that defendant at least be made to, justify his three-year delay
before raising the point. If he had been limited to a direct attack, this he
would have had to do.
40
Even after three years, two "direct" procedures were still available. The
district court could have treated defendant's answer as a claim for equitable
guage, the federal courts readily held that a jury trial could be waived. Parsons v.
Armor, 3 Pet. 413, 425 (U.S. 1830) (express waiver); Bank of Columbia v, Okely, 4
Wheat. 235, 243 (U.S. 1819) (waiver in making note negotiable at bank whose charter
authorized collection by summary proceeding). But in waiving a jury, the parties ran
into trouble from another quarter. The courts felt they could not review findings of
fact unless they were based on a jury verdict or on a stipulation by the parties, Catnp.
bell v. Boyreau, 21 How. 223 (U.S. 1858) ; Guild v. Frontin, 18 How. 135 (U.S. 1855).
Hence waiver of jury resulted in waiver of appellate review as well. Ibid.
The first statutory attempt to cure this dual effect of waiver came in 1865 when
Congress recognized waiver by written stipulation. 13 STAT. 501 (1865). Court trial
in such cases was laced on a par with jury trial by an express provision for appellate
review of the court's rulings. Ibid. But the courts continued to recognize other kinds of
waiver where full review was denied. E.g., Edwards v. Dow, 230 Fed. 378 (6th Cir.
1916) (waiver by not objecting to trial by the court alone).
Congress again attempted to ameliorate the effects of this practice by providing for
full review where the waiver was by oral stipulation as well as when in writing. 46 STAr.
486 (1930). And shortly thereafter the courts removed the need for further amendment.
by ignoring their strict rule limiting review, even though waiver was neither written nor
oral. Globe & Rutgers Ins. Co. v. Rose, 91 F.2d 635 (8th Cir. 1937) (waiver by not ob-
jecting to trial by court alone).
In 1938 the two provisions for specific methods of waiver were brought together in
the Federal Rules. FED. R. Crv. P. 38, 39; see Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules,
28 U.S.C. following § 723(c) (1946). In so doing, the Advisory Committee expressly
disavowed any intention of modifying the right to a jury trial as contained in the old
Judiciary Act. Ibid. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that the "shall be" in Rule
39 does not prevent the courts from continuing to recognize waiver by methods other
than those specified. And the fear of a limited review should be no objection to con-
sidering absence at the trial as a waiver, since the review provisions of the Federal Rules
clearly apply. See FED. R. Civ. P. 46, 52, 73, 75, and Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules, 28 U.S.C. following § 723(c) (1946).Such a non-exclusive interpretation of specific waiver provisions has been sanctioned
by the New York courts. In the New York Civil Practice Act, section 42S states that
"an issue of fact must be tried by a jury unless a jury is waived." And, although section
426 specifies methods for waiving a jury, these methods are not held to be exclusive.
MacKellar v. Rogers, 109 N.Y. 468, 17 N.E. 350 (1888); Dostko v. Szymaniak, 133 Misc,
657, 233 N.Y. Supp. 167 (1929).
40. See pp. 345-6 supra and notes 41 and 43 infra.
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relief, analogous to the independent equity suit to enjoin enforcement of the
judgment.4' Or it could have stayed the current action2 pending a decision
in the Kansas federal court under Rule 60(b), which authorizes a court to set
aside its own judgment for "justifiable" reasons within a "reasonable" time
after entry. 43
By raising defendant's case to the status of a "collateral" attack, however,
the Fifth Circuit saved the defendant the trouble of justifying his three-year
failure to keep track of his attorney and his case. But more important, the
court has inferentially declared an open season on a whole class of judgments,
which lackadaisical losers may now pursue at their leisure. This result is
neither necessary nor appropriate to justice for all parties to a dispute. It is
an ill-founded breach of the general policy favoring a timely end to legal
wrangling.
41. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 2 (joinder of law and equity). See also Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. following § 723 (c) (1946); CUrW, CODE PLIAD..n § 93
(1947).
Abandonment by counsel is a recognized ground for such equitable relief. Seward
v. Churn Ranch Co., 136 Neb. 804, 287 N.W. 610 (1939); Stanley v. Spana, 21 S.M2d
305 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929). To qualify for this relief the complainant must show that
he had a meritorious case which he was kept from presenting through no fault of his
own, see 3 Fr.zxEYAi §§ 1189, 1213, and that he has not been dilatory in pressing his claim
for relief. Village of Celina v. Eastport Savings Bank, 63 Fed. 401 (6th Cir. 1895)
(relief denied loser who waited a year to bring his suit) ; 3 Fnmmma; § 1192. Although
the claimant was personally free from fault, he may be met by the notion that his attor-
ney's negligence is imputable to him. See note 43 infra. And the general equity re-
quirement that the complainant have no adequate remedy at lay, 3 FhrEnnAw §§ 1194-5.
has been held to bar a loser who could still attack the judgment by motion before the
rendering court. Kieffer v. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co., 9 F.2d 260 (1925) ; Travelers' Pro-
tective Ass'n of America v. Gilbert. 111 Fed. 269 (8th Cir. 1901). See 3 Fnnammmi § 1197.
42. Cf. Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936); Mottolese v. Kaufman,
13 F.R.S. 30b.31, Case 1 (2d Cir. 1949).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949) (four
years a "reasonable" time when petitioner vas in jail for most of it). In addition to
establishing his diligence, the Bass defendant would have had to establish abandonment
by his attorney as a "justifiable" reason for relief. Such abandonment is a recognized
ground for relief under a motion to vacate. People's Finance & Thrift Co. v. Phoenix
Assurance Co., 104 Cal. App. 334, 285 Pac. 857 (1930); Lewis v. Van Hooser, 206 Mo.
App. 618, 227 S.W. 618 (1921). And the motion to set aside under Rule 60(b) is an
equivalent mode of relief. Assmann v. Fleming, 159 F2d 332 (8th Cir. 1947). See, gen-
erally, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 28 U.S.C. following §723(c) (1946);
3 MoonE, FEDmRAL PRAcaTi 3254-84 (1st ed. 1938) ; id. at 287-99 (Supp. 1948) ; Moore
& Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 Y=s L.J. 623 (1946). Moreover,
the court would probably require the defendant to prove that his original defense vas a
meritorious one. Assmann v. Fleming, supra. And if the defendant did not stumble over
this requirement, he still faced the possibility that his attorney's negligence would be
imputed to him. See Ledwith v. Storkan, 2 F.R.D. 539 (D. Neb. 1942); 3 Fnmmm;
§ 1253.
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DISCRIMINATORY LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EQUAL
PROTECTION FROM THE LAW':,
STATE discrimination against individuals or groups is prohibited by the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' While courts have
readily used this clause to strike down discriminatory law, 2 they have never
been fully converted to the proposition that discriminatory enforcement of a
nondiscriminatory law is also within the constitutional prohibition. The in-
equality tolerated by this judicial hands-off policy is particularly acute where
a law has ceased to reflect contemporary public opinion: it is then that en-
forcement is sporadic and most likely to be discriminatory.4
* Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 36 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. 1949).
1. U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. XIV, § 1.
2. E.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). See Tussman and tenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUFI. L.
Rrv. 341 (1949). And see note 18 infra.
3. Where courts have squarely met the issue in criminal prosecutions, they have
generally held that failure to enforce the law impartially is no defense to an act which is
substantively illegal. E.g., Patterson v. State, 18 Ala. App. 55, 88 So. 360 (1921) (sale of
prohibited liquor) ; People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P2d 118 (1943) (perjury
in voter's affidavit of registration) ; Creash v. State, 131 Fla. 111, 179 So. 149 (1938) (lot.
tery: bingo); Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonvealth, 241 Ky. 48, 43 S.W.2d 321
(1931) (Sunday law). Similarly, in suits to enjoin discriminatory police interference
courts have held that such activity does not "rise to the dignity of unconstitutional dis-
crimination. . . ." Buxbom v. City of Riverside, 29 F. Supp. 3, 8 (S.D. Cal. 1939) (dis-
criminatory enforcement of ordinance regulating the distribution of advertising leaflets) ;
Jackie Cab Co. v. Chicago Park Dist., 366 I1. 474, 9 N.E.2d 213 (1937) (discrimination
against Negro taxi drivers in enforcement of ordinance prohibiting cab-sharing).
A few courts have, however, recognized the clause's applicability to discrimination in
law enforcement. Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947)
(order dismissing complaint for injunction overruled: allegedly discriminatory enforce-
ment of ordinance prohibiting sale of magazine subscriptions on the street) ; City of Cov-
ington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.W.2d 1040 (1933) (injunction granted: ordinance
prohibiting sidewalk displays of merchandise enforced against merchants but not against
farmers). See Boynton v. Fox, 60 F.2d 851, 854 (10th Cir. 1932) ; People v. Oreck, 74
Cal. App. 2d 215,221-2, 168 P.2d 186, 190-1 (1946).
4. Sporadic enforcement can hardly be explained by a desire to effectuate the law's
purpose, since the law, vitiated to the extent of its nonenforcement, has ceased to exert any
significant influence on the pattern of community behavior. See Moore & Callahan, Law
and Learning Theory: A Study in Legal Control, 53 YALE L.J. 1, 83-5 (1943) ; Poller,
Law, Conscience and Society, 6 LAw. GuILD REv. 490, 491 (1946). The court may have
been aware of this proposition in Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal, App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d
181 (1947). An allegation of discriminatory enforcement of a wartime ordinance prohibit-
ing the sale of magazine subscriptions on the street was held to state a cause of action
after the war emergency had become less acute and the law unnecessary. Ibid. And see
People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 14, 117 P.2d 437, 446 (1941) (prosecution for
pandering) ("[T]he only possible application of the doctrine of the Yick Wo case
to a criminal prosecution would appear to be in an instance where a person was under
prosecution for the commission of some otherwise harmless act which ordinarily had not
theretofore been treated as a crime.") ; Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky.
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Typical of such abusive enforcement is the application of Alichigan's lot-
tery law5 to a charitable institution0 in Society of Good Neighbors v. Van
48, 51-2, 43 S.W2d 321, 322-3 (1931) (elaborate justification for upholding discriminatory
enforcement of a Sunday law by stressing the supposed public necessity for such laws).
5. Mica. STAT. ANw. § 28.604 (Henderson 1938).
6. Nonenforcement of lottery laws as applied to charitable institutions is not con-
fined to Michigan. While all American jurisdictions prohibit lotteries, see, e.g., Arm
CoNsT. Art. 19, § 14; CoLO. CoNsT. Art. XVIII, § 2; Ky. Rv. STAr. A i.i. § 436.360
(1948) ; N. J. STAT. AxN. § 2:57-8 (1939), in none of them do most people fed that lot-
tery laws should be enforced against charitable institutions. A nationwide poll asking the
question, "Do you think that lotteries similar to the Irish Hospitals' Sweepstakes and con-
ducted only for charity. .. should be allowed in this country?" received the following
response: Yes, 55.3%; No, 32.5%; Don't know, 12.3%.
The geographical results were as follows:
N.E. S.E. S.W. NV. Pacific Coast
Yes 57.57o 48.3% 40.8c 44.3% 78.%
No 31.5 32.1 44.6 41.5 17.2
Don't know 11.0 19.6 14.6 142 4.1
Fortune, October, 1935, pp. 168, 170.
Moreover, charitable lotteries appear to flourish unmolested in most jurisdictions. See
What Church (If Any) Runs Lotcries? 49 CH~isrA Cm~tuaR 1045 (1932); Literary
Digest, Jan. 1, 1938, pp. 32-4; Legis., 34 IowA L. REv. 647, 651-2 (1949) ; sec Creash v.
State, 131 Fla. 111, 122-6, 179 So. 149, 153-5 (1938). For example, clear indications may
be found in New Haven, Connecticut, of the nonenforcement of the Connecticut lottery
law, ComN. GEr. STAT. §§ 8667-71 (1949), against charitable institutions. Although
charitable bingo games are permitted in Connecticut, CoNe. G=a. STAT. § 703 (1949), other
charitable lotteries or games of chance are not. CoNN. Gm. STAT. §§ 8667-71 (1949). Of
12 Catholic churches investigated in June, 1949, 3 conducted annual bazaars or carnivals,
5 conducted raffles, 3 conducted bingo games, and 3 had no gambling at all. At one church
a bazaar was in progress from June 17 to June 25, 1949, at which there were 9 roulette
wheels and one dice game. Two automobiles were also being raffled off at the time. The
police requested only that noise be kept to a minimum and that a large sign advertising the
raffle be replaced by a smaller one. On April 27, 1949, the New Haven police raided 23
gambling establishments and made 41 arrests in an effort to wipe out all "illegal" gambling
in the city. New Haven Evening Register, April 28, 1949, p. 1, col. 3. On the same day,
however, the Register was offering an automobile as the prize in a public raffle which it
was conducting for the benefit of the New Haven Boys' Club Summer Camp. Id. at p. 7,
col. 4.
For a running account of the public's opposition to the late Mayor La Guardia's un-
successful attempt at enforcing the state lottery law, N. Y. PzAL LAW §§ 1370, 1372,
1376, 1383, against New York City churches, see N. Y. Times, Nov. 26, 1942 p. 29, col. 6;
Nov. 30, 1942, p. 1, col. 2; Dec. 1, 1942, p. 27, col. 5; Dec. -2, 1942, p. 27, col. 8; Dec. 3,
1942, p. 27, col. 1; Dec. 4, 1942, p. 1, col. 2; Dec. 5, 1942, p. 17, col. 6; Dec. 9, 1942, p. 29,
col. 6; Dec. 24, 1942, p. 1, col. 2. And see N. Y. Herald Tribune, Oct. 17, 1949, p. 1, col.
1, for the New Jersey gubernatorial candidates' attempt to secure support of Catholic
arouos by advocating legalization of charitable bingo games.
In spite of this public and official approval of charitable lotteries, charities may legally
conduct bingo or beano (another form of bingo) in only a few states. E.g., Co-.-.-. Gmn.
STAT. § 703 (1949) ; Mj. REv. STAT. c. 126, §§ 21-7 (1944) ; MD. AzNN. CODE GE.. LAws
Art. 27, § 302 (1939); R. I. GEN. LAws c. 612, § 56 (1938). A similar beano law in
Massachusetts was construed strictly while it was in force, Commonwealth v. O'Connell,
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Antwerp Plaintiff, a relief organization in the city of Detroit, had been
conducting bingo games for several years when the local police developed a
prejudicial attitude toward it.8 Intimidation of the Society and its patrons
was followed by instigation of a grand jury investigation into its operations
for the purpose of prosecuting it under the state lottery law. The Society
sued to enjoin the police from engaging in further detrimental action.0 It
alleged that while many other charitable organizations were operating lotteries
in the city of Detroit, it alone had been singled out as the object of interfer-
ence.
The Society relied on Yick Wo v. Hopkins'° to convert these fact allega-
tions into a cause for equitable relief within the equal protection clause. But
the Michigan Supreme Court, while accepting the facts as true, rejected the
application of Yick Wo.11 The distinguishing feature which it found was the
discretionary nature of the official action involved: in Yick Wo the adminis-
trator had abused a "discretionary" duty to determine what activity was sub-
stantively unlawful, whereas here the police were performing a "non-discre-
tionary" duty of punishing a crime substantively defined by the legislature."
293 Mass. 459, 200 N.E. 269 (1936) (game for which players were selected by chance held
not to be beano), and has since been amended to legalize only charitable whist or bridge
parties. MAss. AmN. LAws c. 271, § 22A (Supp. 1948).
7. 36 N.W.2d 308 (Mich. 1949).
8. This attitude appeared to be the result of personal animosity on the part of tie
assistant police superintendent and political differences with other city officials. Brief for
Appellant, p. 3; Transcript of Record, pp. 5, 8-9.
9. After suit was begun, the police committed their first act of physical interference
by raiding one of plaintiff's bingo games and confiscating a good deal of its equipment.
Brief for Appellant, p. 5; Transcript of Record, pp. 18-19.
10. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). A San Francisco ordinance required a license to operate
laundries located in buildings constructed neither of brick nor stone. A large number of
such licenses had been issued to Caucasians, but had been withheld in every instance from
Chinese operating under similar conditions. In releasing on habeas corpus a Chinese Im-
prisoned for operating a laundry without a license, the Supreme Court said: "Though the
law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and adminis-
tered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
Id. at 373-4.
11. Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 36 N.W. 2d 308, 310 (Mich. 1949).
12. As a secondary ground for decision, the supreme court ruled that plaintiff, as a
law violator, could have no remedy in equity. Ibid. Invocation of this "clean handg" doc-
trine in the context of discriminatory law enforcement seems singularly inappropriate.
For while "clean hands" may have some utility as an expression of judicial reluctance to
aid illegal transactions, see Chafee, Corning Into Equity With Clean Iands, 47 Mcix. L.
REv. 877, 889 (1949), the doctrine makes little sense where employed to give judicial
blessing to discriminatory government action. And the court's interjection of ethical con-
siderations is even more paradoxical, since the court by granting the injunction would not
have condoned the plaintiff's infractions: future enforcement on a non-discriminatory basis
would still have been permissible. See note 21 infra.
The court incorrectly assumed that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law. Society
of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 36 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Mich. 1949). While plaintiff
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The assertion that the police can exercise no discretion not only ignores the
realities of law enforcement,' 3 but belies the court's professed acceptance of
plaintiff's fact allegations.' 4 Indeed, if police discretion is to be thus ruled
out of future cases, litigants will be precluded from ever showing police dis-
crimination. And such preclusion is not justified by the frequent necessity
for limiting the number of prosecutions. This necessity stems from shortages
of money, men, or equipment, or from the physical impossibility of apprehend-
ing all offenders. Selectivity in prosecution resulting from these factors
usually pursues a rational pattern designed to secure effective enforcement."
On the other hand, the sole purpose of discriminatory enforcement is to dis-
criminate. The abolition of such discrimination need not impair the admitted
utility of selective enforcement: the existence of a rational plan of enforce-
ment would make it impossible for one claiming discrimination to meet the
heavy burden of proof required in such actions.' 0
could have interposed the Fourteenth Amendment as a defense if prosecuted, the police
apparently intended to end the bingo games by extra-legal coercion such as continued in-
vestigation and threats of prosecution. Transcript of Record, p. 20. And an action for
damages against the police would have had little chance of success. In Cooper v. O'Connor,
99 F2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1938), a prosecutor was immune from tort liability even though he
acted maliciously; and see Keefe, Personal Tort Liability of Admninistrave Offcials, 12
FoRD. L. REV. 130, 144-5 (1943). Plaintiff might also have sued the police to recover the
confiscated equipment. See note 9 sumra. Success in such a suit would not, however, have
provided plaintiff with an "adequate" remedy. Moreover, if the Court felt that plaintiff
had stated a cause of action at law, it should not have dismissed the complaint. Transfer
of the suit to the law side of the court would have been the appropriate procedure. Mnnr.
STAT. ArN. § 27.652 (Henderson 1938).
13. State ex inf. Mc Kittrick v. Wallach, 353 Mo. 312, 322-3, 182 S.lWV2d 313, 319
(1944). Clearly, it is up to the enforcing officials to decide whether the purpose of a law
has been sufficiently undermined to warrant arrest and prosecution. See Cohen, "Real"
and "Ideal" Force in Civil Law, Int'l Journal of Ethics, Apr., 1916, p. 347, 357: "'e can-
not eliminate the judgment from the law [i.e., statute], because those who have to enforce
the law must be guided by this judgment in order to determine the actual contents
of the law." As a result of this exercise of discretion, many laws remain unenforced
generally, or against certain groups or individuals. See Everhart v. People, 54 Colo. 272,
284, 130 Pac. 1076, 1081 (1913). For specific examples see the unenforcement of lottery
laws as applied to charitable institutions, supra note 6, the selective enforcement policy
followed by OPA, infra note 15, and the laxity in enforcement of traffic and parking
ordinances in New York City. N.Y. World-Telegram, July 15, 1949, p.3, col. 1.
14. "Well pleaded allegations in a bill of complaint, and inferences drawn therefrom,
must be taken as true and construed in a light favorable to the plaintiff." 36 N.A. 2d
308, 310 (Mich. 1949).
15. See OPA AIAxuAT c. 9, § 1702.02: "...OPA must develop techniques and
criteria for choosing a relatively small number of key cases to prosecute criminally. OPA
cannot in this way punish all violators who deserve criminal penalties. No prosecution
should be recommended unless the case has clear significance for enforcement beyond the
administering of deserved punishment." This is one of many instances where discretion
plays an important part in law enforcement. See note 13 mipra.
16. For examples of failure to prove discrimination in the face of a rational plan of
enforcement, see Mackay v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94, 100 (1919) (prosecution deemed
test case to determine scope of ordinance; discrimination against defendant not shown,
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Moreover, the court's distinction between "discretionary" and "non-dis-
cretionary" government activityT is at best a tenuous one in terms of the oft-
repeated purpose of the equal protection clause-to protect persons from dis-
crimination by all public officials.' 8 That purpose is but partly realized if
persons suffering discrimination at the hands of regulating officials are pro-
tected, while those suffering discrimination at the hands of enforcing officials
are not.
The discriminatory nature of the police activity seems, nonetheless, to have
been outweighed by the court's fear that an injunction for plaintiff would en-
title other operators of charitable bingo games to the same relief, and thus
partially nullify a valid penal law.19 But to assume that there are other chari-
table institutions facing prosecution is to assume away the plaintiff's chief
claim for relief, namely that the Michigan lottery law is never so enforced. 0
Moreover, the court seemed to overlook the possibility that the law might be
resurrected and enforced on a non-discriminatory basis.21
although no others similarly situated were prosecuted) ; Broad-Grace v. Bright, 48 F. 2d
348 (E.D. Va. 1931), aff'd, 284 U.S. 588 (1931) (officials had from time to time brought
criminal charges to test applicability of Sunday law; enforcement here held non-dis-
criminatory). See note 22 infra.
17. The verbal nature of this distinction becomes obvious in cases where courts at-
tempt to distinguish between the adoption of regulations pursuant to a law and enforce-
ment of a similar law. Compare the facts in Pierce v. Schram, 116 Neb. 263, 216 N.W.
809 (1927) (regulations unconstitutional; discrimination found) with the similar facts in
Chapman v. City of Lincoln, 84 Neb. 534, 121 N.W. 596 (1909) (enforcement of an or-
dinance constitutional; discrimination ruled out).
18. See Chicago, B., & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-4 (1897). "[T]he
prohibitions of the [fourteenth] amendment refer to all the instrumentalities of the State,
to its legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, and, therefore, whoever by virtue of
public position under a state government deprives another of any right protected by that
amendment . . 'violates the constitutional inhibition; and ... his act is that of the
State.'"
The equal protection clause has, in fact, been applied to all government activity.
E.g., Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) (municipal ordinance) ; Home Tel.
and Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913) (administrative regulation); Hill v.
Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942) (judicial procedure); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)
(judicial enforcement of private restrictive covenant). However, the applicability of
the clause is occasionally limited by a restricted view of what is sufficient to state a cause
of action under it. E.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1934). See also note 3 supra.
19. "Should ,the relief which plaintiff seeks be granted, other operators of charitable
bingo games would be entitled to the same relief and the ultimate effect would be the
nullification of a valid statute." 36 N.W. 2d 308, 310 (Mich. 1949).
20. At least forty-three bingo parties are operated in the city of Detroit without
being molested by the police. Brief of Appellant, p. 12. Among the unmolested organ-
izations are the Detroit Fire Department, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the American
Legion, and the State of Michigan itself. Transcript of Record, pp. 13-14. This con-
forms with the widespread unenforcement of lottery laws against charitable institutions.
See note 6 supra.
21. In Wade v. San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (1947), the court,
in reversing dismissal of a complaint for injunctive relief against discriminatory law en-
forcement, said: "[I]f the proof satisfies the [trial] court that the ordinance is being
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Perhaps the court realized that an injunction here could not possibly have
hindered enforcement of a law already dead as to charitable organizations, but
feared complete nullification of "necessary" laws, i.e., laws which at least to
some extent afe fulfilling their expressed purpose, Yet this fear too seems
virtually groundless, whatever the situation may be.
In one kind of situation, the statute by its terms requires general enforce-
ment, the legislature fully intends it, and administrative officials are enforcing
the law universally or in a rationally selective manner. This presents no
problem for the courts, since those alleging discrimination cannot meet their
burden of proof.2
A second situation arises when again the statute requires and the legislature
intends general enforcement, but enforcement officials are directing their at-
tention to one class of violators only. In this case, court injunction against
the discriminatory enforcement would tend to bolster the "necessary" law by
compelling enforcement officials either to generalize their operations or face
inquiry and discipline at the hands of an exasperated legislature.
The final situation is that typified by the Michigan lottery statute: the law
presumes general enforcement; the legislature apparently no longer intends
enforcement against a particular favored class--charitable institutions; en-
forcement officials apply the law to commercial lotteries, but also apply it
sporadically to certain charities for illegitimate reasons. Here again injunc-
tions against discrimination would do good rather than harm. Such court
action would either cause enforcement officials to cease their activities against
members of the favored class, or stimulate general enforcement. In either
case, legislators would be compelled eventually to make the law mean what
they now intend it to mean. If enforcement were confined to disfavored
groups, they could validly charge discrimination, and the legislature would
have to restrict the law to them to remove the basis for this charge. And if
enforcement became general, the legislature could restore protection to favored
groups only by a similar restriction. A law distinguishing behveen com-
mercial and charitable lotteries undoubtedly rests on a "reasonable classifica-
tion," and the requirements of the equal protection clause would be fully met.
Equal protection requires non-discriminatory law enforcement, even at the
risk of nullifying "necessary" statutes. -s In the Van Antwerp case, where
enforced .. . with intentional discrimination, any injunction issued ... should be so
framed as to permit the future enforcement of the ordinance against all violators without
discrimination if the defendants see fit . . . so to enforce it." Id. at 339-40, 186 P2d at 183.
22. For examples of unsuccessful attempts to prove discrimination in the rational en-
forcement of "necessary" laws see Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500 (1905) (discrimina-
tion against Chinese not sufficiently shown in enforcement of ordinance prohibiting the
exhibition of gambling implements in a barricaded house) ; People v. Zammora, 66 Cal.
App. 2d 166, 236-7, 152 P.2d 180, 216 (1944) (prosecution for murder) ; State Y. Smith,
93 At. 353 (R.I. 1915) (same). See also notes 15 and 16 supra.
23. Most courts, however, have not extended the equal protection clause to cases of
discriminatory enforcement. See cases cited note 3 supra. For cases arguing for a broader
interpretation of the clause, see Covington v. Gausepohl, 250 Ky. 323, 62 S.AV2d 1040
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